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The knowledge-based economy differs from a material or capital-based economy in 
that it recognizes knowledge as the core of competitiveness and the driving force for 
long-term growth. The rules of the game in the knowledge-based economy are speed, 
flexibility and innovation. In the ‘new economy’, newly starting and rapidly growing 
companies are, almost from their inception, selling to global markets, and thus the 
established companies are forced to reinvent their operations in order to stay competitive in 
the new game.  The new knowledge-based economy has brought major changes to the 
organization of production, market structures, occupational choices, and so on, challenging 
traditional idea of national comparative advantage based on the endowment of basic 
resources of land, capital and labor.  In the knowledge-based economy, the most important 
kinds of capital are human capital and organizational capital, as opposed to financial 
capital, and the pace of innovation is now driving the evolution of the industry with a speed 
unimaginable in the past. 
The challenges brought about by the knowledge-based economy have also greatly 
affected the roles of the government.  Instead of managing business cycles, the policy focus 
of the government has shifted to fostering innovation.  The crucial infrastructure for 
industrial competition today does not comprise of roads, ports, and public utilities, but 
‘information super-highways’ that facilitate the transmission of information. 
Technological advances in personal computers, telecommunications and the Internet have 
laid the foundations for this kind of infrastructure, thus the adequacy of public 
infrastructure is no longer measured by the length of highways and railroads, but by the 
penetration of broadband networks, and the like.  And no longer are television or 
automobile ownership an appropriate indicator of the state of economic development, the 
Internet access rate is now probably more fitted to that purpose. 
This paper addresses the implications of the knowledge-based economy on the 
organization of world production, focusing on Taiwan, which was previously a 
manufacturing-based economy serving as an international subcontractor.  The innovation- 
driven, time-based competition of the knowledge-based economy has greatly changed the 
roles of Taiwanese manufacturers and their working relationships with other players in the 
  1 market.  We focus on Taiwan’s personal computer and IC industries to illustrate the 
changing patterns of the division of labor, and to show that the knowledge-based economy 
is much more than just high-technology manufacturing. 
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows.  In the next section, the status of Taiwan’s 
knowledge-based industries is discussed.  In section III, we discuss the restructuring of the 
world production system under the knowledge-based economy, followed, in section IV, by 
a discussion of the changes in the market structure.  In sections V and VI, the cases of 
personal computer and IC industries are explored. Concluding remarks are provided in 
section VII. 
 
II.   The Growth of Knowledge-based Industries in Taiwan 
 
Following the OECD’s (1996) guidelines on the definition of knowledge-based 
industry (KBI), in 1996, Taiwan’s Council for Economic Planning and Development 
(CEPD) calculated the share of KBI in Taiwan’s economy at 40.6% (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1   Growth of knowledge-based industry in Taiwan 
   Unit: % 







Industries           
1991 100.0  37.7  6.1  31.7 
1994 100.0  39.2  5.7  33.5 
1996 100.0  40.6  6.8  33.7 
As a proportion 
of GDP (%) 
                  
1991-94 9.8  11.2  7.6  11.9 
1994-96 10.2  12.1  20.5  10.6 
Growth rate in 
value-added 
(nominal) 
1991-96 9.9  11.5  12.6  11.3 
 
Note:    Knowledge-based manufacturing industries include aerospace, computer and data-processing equipment,  
pharmaceutical, telecommunications, semiconductors, scientific instruments, automobiles, electrical 
equipment, chemical products, machinery, other transport equipment; Knowledge-based service industries 
include transport and storage, communication services, finance, insurance, and real estate, commercial 
services, social and personal services. 
 
Source:   Council for Economic Planning and Development, based on Input-Output Tables. 
 
This figure is substantially lower than the average of OECD countries, which was 
estimated at 50.9% in the same year, but it was nevertheless much greater than the figure 
  2 for Taiwan’s recent past.  In 1991, the share of KBI in Taiwan was only 37.7%, thus it had 
grown by an average of 11.5% (in nominal terms) from 1991-96, higher than the average 
growth rate of 9.9% for all industries combined.   
The growth of KBI in Taiwan was particularly rapid during 1994-96, thanks to the 
phenomenal expansion of the semiconductor industry, but the lion’s share of Taiwan’s KBI 
belongs to the service industry, which may not be so knowledge-intensive after all.  The 
level of knowledge input in Taiwan’s service industry can be judged by the quantity of 
information services that the service industries consume during their production processes.  
Information services include software, Internet services, data exchange, e-commerce, and 
so on.  According to the three-digit classification of service industries, no single industry in 
Taiwan consumes more than 1% of information services as its intermediate inputs.  Even in 
the most information-intensive industry, ‘other commercial services’, expenditure on 
information services accounts for a mere 0.79% of value-added.  In the lowest 
knowledge-intensive industries, say railroad transport, information services accounts for 
only 0.47% of value-added.  The information content of Taiwan’s service industries is, 
therefore, generally low (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2   Information content of the service industries - selected 3-digit industries 
 
Industry 







(3) = (1) / (2) 
% 
       
135  Other Commercial Service  679  86,483  0.79 
128 Hotel  296  42,027  0.70 
134 Leasing  202 42,342  0.48 
116  Railroad Transport    81  17,305  0.47 
121 Telecommunications  687  163,326  0.42 
133 Advertisement  535  133,163  0.40 
130 Legal  accounting  101  25,421  0.40 
150 Miscellaneous  Services  436  118,276  0.37 
129 Real  Estate  751  217,122  0.35 
132 Information  Service  114  40,995  0.28 
121  Storage    60  23,896  0.25 
137  Environmental & Sanitary    83  34,614  0.24 
 
Source:  Data from 1996 Input-Output Tables (Taiwan). 
  3 Taiwan has done much better in the knowledge-intensive manufacturing sectors, 
however.  According to Wu’s (2000) calculations, the high-technology manufacturing 
sectors in Taiwan grew by an average annual rate of 11.79% in real terms from 1991 to 
1997, higher than most OECD countries.  Even Korea - the region’s high-flyer - was only 
able to register an annual growth rate of 3.81% during the same period (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3    Distribution and growth of manufacturing sectors by technology intensity (selected  
countries) 
                            Unit: % 
high  Upper 
Medium 
lower 
medium  low 
















USA  16.0 1.37 31.9 2.91 21.7 1.63 30.4 0.19 
Japan 14.7 0.03 34.1 0.32 27.6 0.17 23.9 -0.41 
Germany  9.7  -4.59 38.0 -1.69 32.1 -0.61 20.2 -3.09 
France  12.2 0.61 28.8 0.14 28.8 -0.23 30.2 0.07 
UK  13.9 -0.08 30.7 1.35 21.1 0.66 34.3 0.60 
Korea 18.5 3.81 29.0 1.14 30.9 -2.23 21.6 -5.96 
Taiwan  19.5  11.79  25.2 3.01 34.0 1.23 20.9 -1.95 
 
Source:   Wu, Rong-I, (2000), ‘Competitiveness Analysis of Taiwan’s Industrial Technology’, paper presented at the  
Conference on the Measurement of Industrial Technology Competitiveness in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy, Taipei, 23
rd - 24
th August 2000. 
 
The total value-added of Taiwan’s high-technology manufacturing sectors accounted 
for 19.5% of the total manufacturing value-added, rivaling the share of OECD countries. 
However, even greater development has occurred since 1996 in some service industries 
that are closely related to the provision and transmission of knowledge.  For example, the 
telecommunications industry grew dramatically as a result of market liberalization in 1996, 
which removed the monopoly power of the state-owned telecommunications bureau.  By 
the end of 1999, the number of cellular-phone users in Taiwan had climbed to 11 million, 
half of the entire population.  In terms of Internet penetration ratio, about 22% of all 
households in Taiwan had hooked up to the Internet, ranking Taiwan second in Asia behind 
Singapore (whose penetration ratio was 48%; Japan’s was just 18%) (APROC Newsletter, 
August 2000).   
  4 Nevertheless, Taiwan still lagged behind most OECD countries in the areas of 
broadband installation and e-commerce.  In 1999, broadband accounted for only 4% of the 
island’s communication networks and e-commerce was virtually negligible.  The 
government does, however, have an aggressive plan aimed at increasing broadband 
coverage to 96% by 2004 and to encourage e-commerce business to reach 9% of GDP at 
the same time (APROC Newsletter, July 2000). The International Data Corp. (IDC) 
recently ranked Taiwan in 21
st place in the world in terms of the information society index 
(APROC Newsletter, July 2000). 
However, the Taiwanese government has in fact been implementing the Asia-Pacific 
Operations Centers (APROC) plan since 1996, aimed at liberalizing and modernizing 
Taiwan’s outmoded service sectors. As a result of this effort, the service industry has 
become increasingly important to Taiwan’s economy.  In 1999, services accounted for 60% 
of Taiwan’s GDP and 3.85% of economic growth, as compared to the 1.76% contributed by 
the manufacturing sectors (the overall economic growth rate was 5.7% in 1999).  Amongst 
the various service sectors, transport, storage and telecommunications registered the 
highest growth rates.  These are also, incidentally, the sectors that provide the important 
logistical support to Taiwan’s manufacturing industries, and which are therefore, heavily 
affected by the restructuring of the world’s production systems in the knowledge-based 
economy. 
In a knowledge-based economy, speed is the essence of competition.  The increased 
accessibility of knowledge and the increased speed of knowledge diffusion have made the 
speed of innovation faster than ever before.  Faster innovation shortens product life cycles 
and makes inventory an unbearable burden in production.  In order to cope with the 
competition of speed, firms have to find ways of cutting the time to market in every facet of 
production.  Hence, the often-neglected elements of production, i.e., logistic services, have 
taken center stage in the competition.  Take personal computers (PCs) as an example; the 
product life cycle for every generation of PCs, which was about one year in the 1980s, was 
reduced by 1999, to around four months. 
In this time-based competition, firms have to organize a global logistics network, such 
that components and parts can be procured and assembled efficiently, and so that final 
  5 products can be rapidly assembled and delivered to the market.  Modernization of the 
shipping and storage system becomes a crucial factor in national competitiveness. From air 
cargo to containers, to bark-commodity shipping, all kinds of transport vehicles need to 
speed up, and barriers to shipping, such as customs procedures, have to be lowered.  Of 
even greater importance, is the necessary upgrading of mechanisms for the transmission 
and exchange of information to facilitate the efficient organization of production and 
prompt decision-making.  Therefore, both traditional and modern means of communication 
enter the center court of competition.  As a direct result of its APROC plan, Taiwan now 
operates a 24-hour customs clearing service for air-cargo at its international airports, and is 
currently working on paperless customs documentation.  The final touch for the APROC 
plan, which was unveiled in August 2000, was the reduction of overall shipping and 
handling costs to 10%-11% of GDP (from the current 13.1%) through the enhancement of 
transportation facilities and electronics-based transactions. (APROC Newsletter, 
September 2000). 
 
III. Restructuring of Worldwide Production Systems  
 
The greatest impact of the knowledge-based economy has been the reorganization of 
world production.  In a knowledge-based economy, a firm is seen as a producer, repository 
and user of knowledge, producing or acquiring knowledge and putting it to use in the most 
efficient way.  A firm’s stock of knowledge underlies its competitive advantage, and all 
firms are likely to be heterogeneous because they possess idiosyncratic knowledge.  A firm 
engages in the production activities where the knowledge it possesses provides it with a 
competitive advantage, and a transaction of products implies an exchange of knowledge.  
In comparison to the rare and uneven distribution of knowledge, non-knowledge inputs to 
production, which include labor and capital, are available to all firms on equal terms. And 
non-knowledge inputs may even have lost their country specificity, as capital markets have 
become globalized, and although wage differentials remain, cheap labor is accessible 
through foreign direct investment.  Thus, a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage has to 
be built on its possession of knowledge rather than on primary inputs. 
In a knowledge-based economy, the separation between innovation and production 
  6 becomes the norm.  This is because innovation and production are only slightly correlated. 
Although knowledge used in inventing a product can be useful in the manufacturing of the 
product, and vice versa, it does not pay an innovator to invest in the manufacturing capacity 
unless it is unable to realize the value of its innovation through outsourcing.  In fact, 
contract manufacturers can perform the production function at a lower cost than the 
innovators themselves because they exploit economies of scale through sharing their 
manufacturing capacity with more than one client.   
In order to make a perfect product, the innovator usually needs to share some 
knowledge with manufacturers, and conversely, some of the manufacturer’s knowledge 
can aid in product innovation.  However, the sharing of knowledge is best arranged in a 
cooperative relationship, because knowledge is intangible and sharing entails 
organizational learning.  Therefore, alliances have become an important form of business 
organization in a knowledge-based economy, and an important source of learning and 
innovation (Powell, Kogut and Smith-Doerr 1996).  Sharing knowledge with someone may 
be more efficient than accumulating such knowledge internally because of the 
‘non-rivalry’ nature of knowledge, which allows the one who partakes of the knowledge to 
pay only a small marginal cost to compensate the owner.  Acquisition of knowledge 
through exchange or alliance may also be more efficient than acquiring a firm that owns the 
knowledge because when acquiring the firm, one also acquires non-essential assets.  In 
sum, a knowledge-based economy is characterized by alliance capitalism. 
Product innovation entails an assortment of knowledge that is relevant to various 
stages of production. Knowledge applied to manufacturing, marketing and customer 
services is complementary to the knowledge used in product innovation. However, vertical 
integration in the value chain is only justified if the internalization of such activities is the 
best way to acquire relevant knowledge, which is often not the case.  As product innovation 
caters to the needs of customers, knowledge obtained from interactions with the customers, 
i.e., marketing, is most valuable to product innovation. Therefore, a combination of 
product innovation and marketing may be the optimal mix of services to be offered by a 
firm.  Merchandisers such as Nike, Reebok and Calvin Klein are typical examples of an 
innovator-marketer combination in the traditional industries of footwear and apparel.     
  7 Even in the high-technology industries, we have observed the trend towards making 
innovation and marketing the core functions of the firm.  Integrated Device Makers (IDMs) 
in the information industry such as Apple, Compaq, Dell and Motorola, have each 
partitioned themselves from manufacturing and designated such activities to contract 
manufacturers. Even in the semiconductor industries, fabless designers have been the 
driving force of product innovation, working closely with the providers of foundry 
services.  
Meanwhile, we increasingly observe that contract manufacturers are required to 
perform customer service functions in addition to making and delivering the products.  
So-called ‘global logistics’ has prevailed in the knowledge-based economy mainly because 
the knowledge of the organization of production is also useful in the arrangement of 
shipping and warehousing, and the knowledge of making products is also useful in fixing 
the products.  Therefore, we observe a new division of labor in the knowledge-based 
economy where firms endowed with heterogeneous knowledge perform production 
activities in line with the knowledge-content of production; country-specific advantages 
become secondary factors in the determination of production pattern.  
As a manifestation of this thesis, we have observed a resurgence of manufacturing 
activities in the US, taking the form of consigned production (Sturgeon 2000).  The 
contract manufacturers that maintain global production facilities divide their labor within 
the firm in line with the location-specific advantages.  Similarly, R&D is also globalized 
(OECD, 1997).  Foreign investment has become an increasingly important source of 
innovation (Zender, 1999), and the new division of labor has boosted the role of contract 
manufacturers.  In the electronics industry, for example, the revenue of the world’s largest 
20 contract manufactures grew at an annual rate of 30.7% in 1988-92, and at an even higher 
annual rate of 46.4% in 1992-95 (Sturgeon 2000). 
 
III. Market Structure in a Knowledge-Based Economy 
 
As early as 1942, Schumpeter observed that productivity increases in the US economy 
were largely attributable to innovation delivered by the R&D laboratories of large 
American firms in an environment of high barriers to market entry.  Schumpeter argued 
  8 that large firms enjoying stable profits in an oligopolistic market structure have the 
financial resources to build up the ‘knowledge base’ required to apply scientific principles 
to ever more complex innovations. This argument implies that ‘a market structure 
involving large firms with a considerable degree of market power is the price that a society 
must pay for rapid technological advancement’ (Nelson and Winter 1982, p.278).  Two 
major building blocks of Schumpeter’s argument have been broken down by the new 
economy, however.  First of all, financial resources to support innovation do not have to 
come from the innovators themselves, as new financial developments, such as venture 
capital, can provide the mechanism to support innovative activities.  Secondly, market 
power is not necessarily correlated to firm size, especially if a firm’s size is measured by its 
scale of production.  Instead, it is knowledge that forms the cornerstone of market power. 
The breakdown of the Schumpterian innovation manifests itself in an increasingly 
important role played by small firms in product innovation.  A start-up company with good 
innovative ideas has the capacity to attract both financial and human resources to become a 
large company within a short span of time.  In fact, even monopoly power created by 
innovation is often short-lived because it will soon be nullified by further new innovations. 
There is, therefore, no effective way for a monopoly firm to erect entry barriers without the 
assistance of the government.  Market power can only be maintained with continuous 
innovation, as exemplified in the case of the central processing units (CPU) of personal 
computers. 
On the other hand, there seems to be increasing concentration in the manufacturing 
stage of production.  Our explanation of this phenomenon is that large manufacturing firms 
enjoy economies of scale, economies of scope, and economies of speed in the application 
of knowledge.  Such benefits do not exist at the innovation stage.  The knowledge needed 
for manufacturing includes product engineering, processing technologies, tooling, quality 
control, the organization of production, and so on.  This kind of knowledge can be applied 
to the same product with different designs, and to different production locations.  Therefore, 
we have observed that a contract manufacturer may work for multiple designers and 
produce similar products from various locations around the world.  
For a manufacturer, the advantage of being large increases with the knowledge content 
  9 of manufacturing.  Knowledge can be thought of as a sunk fixed input.  The more costly 
this knowledge is, the greater the advantage that can be gained from a larger scale of 
production. Therefore, manufacture of the newly-invented products tends to be more 
concentrated than the manufacturing of mature products.  Thus small firms without the 
requisite knowledge endowment to engage in the production of innovative products can 
only participate in mature product markets.  But even there, the prospects for small firms 
remain bleak in a knowledge-based economy because large firms still enjoy economies of 
scope in applying their superior knowledge.   
Small firms, therefore, can only retreat to those niche markets that are immune from 
the dominance of economies of scale and economies of scope by these large firms.  The 
large firms also enjoy the benefits of globalized production from the common governance 
of knowledge application in various locations, and from being able to deliver products to 
consumers at a higher speed than small firms that cannot afford multinational production.  
Increasingly, speed has become more important than cost in global competition. 
 
IV. The Case of Personal Computers  
 
  Taiwan is known as one of the major players in the personal computer (PC) industry, 
and currently ranks third largest producer of PC products worldwide with a substantial 
number of Taiwanese-made products, such as motherboards, scanners, monitors, and 
notebook computers, enjoying a significant global market share (see Figure 1).  
  An important milestone in the development of Taiwan’s PC industry has been the 
outreach of its firms starting from the late 1980s. Their outward investment was initially 
directed towards Southeast Asia, and more recently towards China and elsewhere in the 
world.  As a result, the offshore production of Taiwan-based PC firms grew from US$973 
million in 1992 to US$18.86 billion in 1999, accounting for 47.29 percent of the 
production by the Taiwan-based firms (Figure 2). 
 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Institute for Information Industry. 
 
Figure 1.  Taiwanese Firms’ World Market Share in PC-Related Products 
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Source:  MIC, Institute for Information Industry 
Figure 2.  The locational distribution of IT production by Taiwan-based firms 
  11 As the ability to manufacture PCs has been diffused widely throughout the world, 
price competition has intensified and profit margins have narrowed for most mature 
computer technologies, with the result that the PC industry has witnessed profound 
changes in terms of inter-firm competition and manufacturing systems.  During this 
process, PC firms in the US have sought to establish new sources of competitive advantage 
by accelerating the pace of new technological developments and increasingly using 
external subcontractors.  As a result, whilst components are now sourced from a global 
network of suppliers, the final assembly of PCs tends to be carried out in each of the major 
market areas of North America, Europe and Asia (Angel and Engstrom, 1995; Borrus and 
Borrus, 1997). 
More specifically, recent developments have led to the emergence of a variant of 
global production networks: global logistics (Chen and Liu, 1999).  In their efforts to 
withstand market encroachment by low-cost clone suppliers, brand marketers in the US, 
led by Compaq, Hewlett Packard, and IBM, now concentrate on R&D and marketing, 
whilst outsourcing their production and logistics operations, for example, to Taiwan-based 
firms.  In specific terms, Compaq pioneered the so-called optimized distribution model, 
which, in essence, aims to provide customers with options as to what, when, and how they 
want, at the lowest available prices.  This operational model has three facets.  First of all, in 
order to narrow the gap between supply and demand, production is required to meet orders 
(build-to-order) rather than forecasts (build-to-forecast).  Secondly, in order to meet the 
variety of customer demands, build-to-order practices are extended to configuration- 
to-order practices, within which customized products are produced in specific quantities.  
Thirdly, Compaq’s vendors are required to undertake final assembly, bringing together a 
set of subassemblies both produced and delivered by Compaq’s subcontractors. From 
Compaq’s perspective, the new production method enables it to concentrate on its core 
competencies of R&D and marketing whilst leaving the rest of the value chain to its 
subcontractors and vendors in Taiwan.  Meanwhile, the latter two types of firms have come 
to resemble members of Compaq’s ‘virtual business’, providing the ammunition for 
Compaq to compete in the global market. 
But what does such a new model of contract manufacturing mean when it comes to the 
  12development of Taiwan’s PC industry?  Underlying the new relationship is the drive to 
reduce production costs, lead-time to market and inventory costs; it is therefore imperative 
for the Taiwanese firms to establish international production and logistics networks to 
serve their customers.  For example, by implementing these new production methods, 
Compaq has completely handed its inventory costs over to its subcontractors.  The latter 
are also required to produce and deliver subsystem products in line with tight schedules, 
and to meet the demand from a variety of markets.  Therefore, they have to ensure that 
everything is synchronized up and down the supply chain.  In order to do so, these 
subcontractors, such as those based in Taiwan, have had to establish a well-structured, 
fast-response global production and logistics network by means of foreign direct 
investment or by the formation of strategic alliances.  Furthermore, they may invariably 
ask their suppliers of components and parts to follow suit in order to link up smoothly, the 
overall supply chain.  As a result, the entire PC production process has increasingly come 
to resemble a ‘just-in-time’ system on a global scale, bringing together the cross-national 
elements of the value chain into a competitively effective production system. 
Therefore, the relationship between Taiwanese PC firms and their customers - owners 
of world-class PC brand names - has gone beyond that of the traditional original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM) arrangement.  Under OEM contracting, Taiwanese PC firms acted 
merely as providers of finished products to their customers.  In contrast, emergent global 
logistics contracting requires Taiwanese subcontractors to take on much greater 
responsibility by participating in supply-chain management, global logistics operations, 
and after-sale services.  In addition, both sides of the contractual relationship now have to 
work closely together and link up electronically in order to create ‘across-the-board’ 
competitive advantages in the industry, engendering escalating interdependence between 
them, and hence, a ‘locked-in’ relationship.  Aided by such relationships, Taiwanese firms 
are able to broaden the scope of their value chains, integrating upstream to R&D and 
downstream to distribution and logistics.  Moreover, with a global production and logistics 
network at their disposal that adequately meet the needs of their customers, Taiwan-based 
PC firms may preempt the entry into the network of their competitors from other countries. 
In other words, the network relationship serves as an entry barrier.  From a Taiwanese 
  13perspective, the owners of these world-class PC brands, which are the international core 
firms of the industry, can be successfully ‘anchored’ to Taiwan’s economy (Chen and Liu, 
2000).  
Looking back to the evolution of the industry, Taiwanese firms could previously rely 
on mainly local-firm networks, stretching from Keelung to Hsinchu, in their production of 
PCs (Kawakami, 1996; Kraemer, 1996).  However, under the global logistics system, they 
now have the ability to mobilize resources from global networks in order to pursue their 
modes of production.  PCs delivered by Taiwan-based firms become the product of the 
innovative and productive efforts of a variety of players and economies around the world.  
Admittedly, PC firms in the US remain in the driving seat, but Taiwan-based firms may act 
as an essential node of the global production network.   
As a result of the disintegration of innovation and production, the market for contract 
manufacturing has now become increasingly concentrated.  Table 4 shows the four-firm 
concentration ratio of some PC-related products in Taiwan’s production.  
 
Table 4   Four-firm concentration ratio of PC-related products 
Unit: % 
Product 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 
Desktop  PC 63.30 62.34 74.17 91.23 81.69 
Notebook  PC  48.72 41.93 64.06 50.31 61.94 
Mouse  69.55 73.58 75.63 84.97 71.04 
Motherboard  37.78 42.54 56.02 40.73 44.33 
Color  monitor -  44.79 50.81 52.92 45.15 
 
Note:   Concentration ratio is measured in terms of quantity produced by top-four firm 
 
Source:  Census of Manufactures, various years, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan. 
 
In terms of desk-top PCs, for example, the ratio was 63.3% in 1992, but rose to 
81.69% in 1997; for notebook computers, the concentration ratio rose from 48.72% in 
1992 to 61.94% in 1997, and although there have been some fluctuations, the trend is clear.  
This concentration ratio, together with Taiwan’s dominant share in the world PC market, 
indicates a high degree of concentration of worldwide production.  Note that the figures 
presented in Table 4 only count production in Taiwan.  Most of these manufacturers also 
  14own offshore production facilities and warehouses in order to provide global logistic 
services to their clients.  For example, the world’s largest SPS producer, Delta, owns 
factories in China, Thailand, Mexico and Taiwan, and operates 27 warehouses around the 
world.  For major clients, which include the world’s top-10 PC and top-5 cellular phone 
handset producers, products are shipped from their warehouses to their assembly lines 
twice a day in a typical ‘just in time’ fashion.   
Taiwanese contract manufacturers are, in fact, not pure contractors; they also engage 
in product design and share the results with brand-name marketers who perform system 
integration.  Delta, for example, maintains five R&D centers around the globe, and 
nowadays, they call themselves original design manufacturers (ODMs).  Compared to the 
pure contract manufacturers such as Solectron and SCI of the US, Taiwan’s ODMs are 
more specialized and less globalized.  Solectron, for example, produces all kinds of 
electronic products, ranging from computers, aerospace and medical equipment, to Internet 
and telecommunications equipment.  Selectron possesses production facilities in North and 
South America, in Europe and in Asia, with 1999 sales revenue of US$8.4 billion (Huang 
2000:80-81).  Economies of scope are, therefore, more apparent amongst these contract 
manufacturers. 
In addition to R&D, Taiwan’s ODM producers have also strived to enhance the value 
of their manufacturing services by integrating forward into consumer services.  For 
example, Taiwan’s largest notebook computer subcontractor, Quanta, has offered a 
‘Taiwan direct ship’ (TDS) service to its customers in a ‘build to order’ arrangement.  With 
TDS, end consumers can monitor the status of the product that they have ordered through 
the electronic data interchange (EDI) service provided by the brand-name marketers or 
sales agents.  A customer can follow the progress of the product from ‘day 1’ to ‘day 7’, as 
the production process goes from materials preparation to final assembly.  It is estimated 
that the TDS service has increased the value of Quanta’s product (notebook computer) by 
US$30-50 a piece (Huang, 2000:73-74.). 
The evolution of the worldwide personal computer industry was driven by the 
innovations of Intel and Microsoft.  As a leading hardware producing country, Taiwan has 
needed to maintain an ever-ready capacity to offer new products incorporating Intel’s new 
  15innovations in advance of its competitors.  As Figure 3 shows, this has indeed happened.  
Back in 1982, it took 3 years for Taiwan’s PC industry to offer a new motherboard with 
Intel’s 80286 CPU inside.  In 1993, this lag had shrunk to just one month, implying a much 
closer working relationship with Intel, as well as a stronger technological capability to 
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Figure 3.  The Developmental Process of the PC Industry in Taiwan 
 
It should be noted that the close working relationship between Taiwan’s hardware 
producers and Intel did not emerge naturally.  In 1995, Intel offered the world’s PC makers 
its own motherboards containing ‘genuine’ Intel CPUs in an attempt to stretch its market 
power and intercept Taiwan’s motherboard business. Produced by the Intel subsidiary in 
South America and Solectron’s factory in Malaysia, the Intel motherboards sold at a 
premium over the Taiwanese products.  Taiwan’s motherboard producers endured the Intel 
challenge, however, with their superior quality and dominant market share in hardware 
manufacturing.  In 1999, Taiwanese firms were still producing 64% of the world’s 
  16motherboards, with the rest split amongst Korean, US firms, and others.  If pushed into a 
corner, Taiwanese motherboard producers would have had no choice but to team up with 
Intel’s rivals, such as AMD, in order to stage a counter-attack.  In fact, there was talk in 
1995 that Taiwan should develop its own CPU to prepare for a showdown with Intel. 
In a knowledge-based economy, the business alliance is contingent on the 
complementarity of knowledge, which can be affected by innovation.  Some innovations 
reinforce existing relationships whilst some loosen them.  The rise of the Internet, for 
example, where internet service providers (ISPs) control the marketing channels, has 
impacted upon the PC industry with increasing demand for low-priced, simple-function 
computers.  In response to this challenge, the Taiwanese firms, which had excelled in 
high-value PCs, have had to restructure themselves.   In reality, the rise of low-priced PCs 
has provided a golden opportunity to Korea’s PC industry for a comeback war with Taiwan. 
In 2000, the export of Korean PCs was expected to reach US$6.3 billion, doubling the 
volume of 1999. However, Taiwan’s PC industry was already responding to the challenge 
with a new production scheme.  ACER, Taiwan’s largest PC maker, for example, 
announced that it planned to ship its low-priced PC en masse by sea rather than by air 
(Huang, 2000:72).  Whether such a strategy is good enough to sustain Taiwan’s dominant 
position in the world PC production remains to be seen. 
 
V.   The Case of the IC Industry 
 
  Taiwan’s IC industry is currently ranked fourth largest in the world, behind the US, 
Japan and Korea.  Of interest are the differences between Taiwan and these forerunners in a 
couple of aspects.  Unlike Korea, which specializes in the production of dynamic random 
access memory (DRAM), Taiwan produces a much greater variety of IC chips, and 
provides IC design houses and IDM firms with foundry services, a strategy which has 
succeeded in capturing around 70% of the global market share.  In addition, Taiwan’s IC 
industry comprises of many small firms, each specializing in a narrow range within the 
value chain, such as IC design, mask production, foundry service, and packing and testing, 
in contrast to the dominance of the vertically integrated conglomerates of Korea and Japan. 
In a sense, Taiwan’s IC industry is organized by industrial networks with a strong 
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  For one thing, the development of Taiwan’s IC industry has been driven by the 
organizational innovation of creating foundry services as a product.  This was a deliberate 
choice made by local entrepreneurs to avoid the risks associated with the market volatility 
of DRAM.  Whilst there are some brand name producers in Taiwan, foundry services still 
accounted for 53% of local IC production in 1999.  By separating fabrication from other 
parts of the value chain, the emergence of foundry services in Taiwan has facilitated a 
proliferation of small- and medium-sized firms in other market segments, such as IC 
design, testing and packaging.  In 1999, there existed in Taiwan 127 firms engaged in IC 
design; 5 in mask production; 21 in wafer fabrication, 42 in packaging; and 33 in testing. 
This flock of firms constitutes a balanced and vertically disintegrated industrial structure. 
  However, despite this vertically disintegrated structure, there is arguably a trend 
towards ‘virtual’ vertical integration amongst local firms in a number of ways.  Firstly, the 
domestic sales ratio for Taiwan’s IC industry has increased from 39.5% in 1996, to 54.7% 
in 1999, which is higher than that for all the major countries, such as North America 
(44.8%), Japan (51.8%) and Europe (43.6%).  Secondly, subcontracting relationships tend 
to be localized.  For example, local contracts accounted for 91.2% of the revenues of 
Taiwan’s IC design houses in 1999, as compared to 72.3% in 1998.  Likewise, around 98% 
of the products designed by Taiwan’s fablesses were packaged locally in 1999.  Thirdly, 
almost 70% of the ICs designed by local fablesses are for the local information industry, 
signifying a strong connection between Taiwan’s IC and PC sectors. 
  In essence, the development of Taiwan’s IC industry has, to a large extent, come to 
resemble the scenario of the flexible specialization thesis of Piore and Sable (1984). 
Fabless IC design houses have proliferated in Taiwan partly because their access to 
external fabrication capacity has lowered the entry barriers to the market.  In addition, the 
geographical concentration of Taiwan’s IC and computer-related firms in the Hsin-Chu 
Science-based Industrial Park has generated agglomeration effects, allowing these firms to 
explore the benefits of geographical proximity and outsourcing. Therefore, whilst 
specializing in one segment of the value chain or another, IC firms in Taiwan are 
interconnected through social and business networks.   Moreover, it is also argued that the 
  18IC industries in Taiwan and Silicon Valley are closely connected.  Table 5 presents data on 
the R&D intensity and capital expenditure intensity of the IC industries in the US, Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan from 1995 to 1999.   
 
Table 5    IC Industry’s R&D intensity
1 and capital expenditure intensity
2 in the US, Japan, Korea  
and Taiwan 
Unit: % 
    1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
R&D Intensity  9.7  11.6  12.1  13.9       - 
US 
Capital Expenditure Intensity  20.7 22.8 17.5 18.0  14.0 
R&D Intensity  6.6  6.5  6.6  6.5       - 
Japan
3 
Capital Expenditure Intensity  16.1 20.8 20.2 18.0  16.0 
R&D Intensity            -  7.9  11.6  12.9       - 
Korea 
Capital Expenditure Intensity  25.7 40.1 51.0 26.0  26.0 
R&D Intensity  7.0  6.9  8.8  9.1       - 
Taiwan 
Capital Expenditure Intensity  31.9 63.4 63.4 73.0  68.0 
 
Notes: 
1.    the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales at percentage. 
2.    the ratio of capital expenditure to sales at percentage 
3.    fiscal year 
 
Source:    IT IS (1999) and IC Insight (2000). 
 
  It is evident that in terms of R&D intensity, the US is the highest among the four 
largest IC producing countries, whereas, in contrast, Taiwan comes top, whilst the US is 
ranked fourth, with regard to capital expenditure intensity.  This points to an interesting 
pattern emerging in the international division of labor between the IC industries of Taiwan 
and the US.  On the one hand, Taiwan’s strength lies in its foundry services, the 
development of which requires substantial investment in fabrication capacities.  On the 
other hand, the US IC firms tend to devote themselves to R&D, design and marketing, 
which is then backed up by their access to Taiwan’s foundry capabilities.   
  This argument seems to be supported by the data in Table 6, which presents details of 
the geographical distribution of the clients of Taiwanese foundry services over the past five 
years.  In 1988, more than half of Taiwan’s foundry capacities served customers in the US, 
whilst local contractors claimed only about 35% of the capacity.  In fact, most of the top ten 
fablesses in the US were clients of Taiwanese foundry companies.  
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Table 6   Geographical breakdown of Taiwan’s foundry service clients 
  Unit: % 
  Taiwan  North America  Western Europe  Others 
1994 30.5  55.1  5.1  9.3 
1995 36.6  55.5  4.0  3.9 
1996 40.8  42.8  11.7  4.7 
1997 47.5  31.2  6.3  15.0 
1998 34.9  51.4  7.2  6.5 
 
Source:  IT IS (1999) 
  Considering its customers as its partners, TSMC, the world’s largest foundry service 
provider, shares its resources and information with them.  Every year, TSMC regularly 
makes known to its customers its plan for developing new process technologies over the 
next five years.  The distributed information is useful for their customers to ensure that the 
process technologies of TSMC can support the development of their products.  As a result, 
the sharing of resources and information not only facilitates the development of a close 
relationship, but also helps to reduce the uncertainty associated with technological 
development on both sides. 
  The connection between Taiwan and the US in the IC industry also takes the form of 
an intensive interface between the experts in both countries.  Underlying this interface are 
Taiwanese and Chinese expatriates abroad who have played important roles in bridging the 
gap between overseas social networks and engineers, and Taiwan, and who have proved 
crucial in connecting the Taiwanese production system with advanced market knowledge 
and technology (Saxenian, 1997; Kim and Tunzelmann, 1998).  According to Saxenian 
(1997), in the 1990s, one out of three specialists working in Silicon Valley came from 
overseas.  There were also in excess of 1,300 firms (or 17%) re under the directorship of 
emigrants from Taiwan. 
  It is worth noting that such industrial networking as exists in Taiwan’s IC industry has 
benefited from recent innovations in information technology, as information technology 
has reduced the uncertainty and transaction costs of purchasing from outside suppliers. 
Moreover, technological changes have made feasible small production runs and frequent 
changes of models, providing more room for small and specialized firms to work in 
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  The innovation-driven semiconductor industry is a classical showcase of the split 
between innovation and production.  In the age of 6-inch wafer processing, foundry service 
providers accounted for only 6% of worldwide IC production.  In the age of 8-inch wafer 
processing, foundry service providers accounted for 14% of worldwide production.  Many 
analysts now predict that in the upcoming age of 12-inch wafer processing, foundry service 
providers will account for 30% to 50% of global output (Huang 2000:37).  In the past, 
foundry-service firms produced mainly logic ICs, in which economies of scope could be 
realized through pooling a large variety of designs together, and using similar processing 
technologies.  Increasingly, memory ICs, particularly DRAM, have entered the foundry 
service market.  In Japan, for example, Mitsubishi, Fujitsu and Toshiba have all become 
major subscribers to Taiwan’s foundry services for DRAM manufacturing.   
  The increased speed of innovation has shortened the product life cycle of IC chips, 
making economies of scale an increasingly important factor in market competition.  It is 
well known in the IC industry that a new 12-inch wafer processing facility will cost around 
US$2.5 billion to establish, and there is no telling how long this particular generation of 
technology will survive the new innovations.  Only those who are able to amass a large 
volume of production can afford the risk of such a big-ticket investment. Therefore, only 
the largest DRAM producers like Micron, Samsung, NEC and Hyundai will build their 
own fabs.  The rest have to outsource from foundry service providers who pool a number of 
small producers together to reach the minimum efficient scale. 
  Driven by rapid innovation, and shortening product life cycles, the IC industry is 
characterized by high rates of capital expenditure as equipment rapidly becomes obsolete. 
As Table 5 demonstrated, Taiwan’s IC industry exhibits the highest capital expenditure 
ratio amongst the major semiconductor nations.  This is partly because Taiwan had the 
lowest base of IC output and partly because Taiwan is specialized in foundry services, the 
most capital-intensive segment of IC production.  Between 1996 and 1999, capital 
expenditure in Taiwan’s IC industry exceeded 60% in each year.  This was possible only 
because the operation of foundry service was very profitable and, at the same time, the 
capital market favored growth-oriented companies.  The former implies high entry barriers 
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accumulated, as the major competitor to Taiwan’s foundry service industry - Singapore’s 
Chartered Semiconductor - found to its cost; it took until 1999 before it was able to report a 
profit, after several years of losses. 
  Despite their large size and dominant position in foundry services, Taiwan’s two 
leading foundry service providers have never attempted vertical integration. United 
Microelectronics (UM) had spun off its IC design operations before it entered the foundry 
service market, and neither UM nor TSMC attempted to enter the field of IC assembly or 
testing.  As innovation has become increasingly globalized, and knowledge has spread 
around the globe, so the increasing need is for knowledge integration. The emergence of 
the ‘system on a chip’ (SOC) in the IC industry is a response to this call.  SOC integrates 
several single chips, which contain distinctive intellectual properties (IP), to perform 
systemized functions, such as those used in cameras or computers.  Knowledge integration 
differs from knowledge creation, and it spawns different kinds of organizations.   
  The increased complexity of SOC designs has induced the modularization of various 
design technologies, called silicon intellectual property (SIP), which can be repetitively 
used as a building block to SOC.  Most SIPs are owned by the fablesses.  The foundry 
service provider is a natural place to verify the value and fabricability of SIPs.  Taiwan’s 
TSMC, for example, has offered a free library and verification service of SIPs for its clients. 
The emergence of SOC has also given rise to ‘chipless’ IC firms, which do business 
without a fab and without owning a chip.  The ‘chiplesses’ only provide IC designs that 
incorporate various intellectual properties, services that are valuable because they provide 
an array of SIPs, saving transaction costs for their clients in dealing with individual owners.  
Taiwan’s largest SOC firm, VIA has bought the CPU design departments of Cyrix and IDT 
and turned them into ‘chipless’ units (Commonwealth, May 25, 2000:132-133). 
 
VI. Conclusions  
 
  The knowledge-based economy has presented several challenges to Taiwan’s 
economy that had traditionally stressed manufacturing capability and de-emphasized 
service and R&D.  Firstly, both producer and consumer services have become important 
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warehousing and telecommunication are crucial components of time-based competition. 
The costs of handling and shipping can determine the competitiveness of manufacturers, 
whilst telecommunication services and other electronics-based information exchange 
mechanisms are important tools in every facet of the organization of production, such as 
supply chain management.  The ability to service consumers also enters the center stage of 
competition.  Providing better services to customers is an effective way of enhancing the 
value of their products, even for specialized manufacturers such as those in Taiwan.   
Nevertheless, Taiwan lags far behind advanced countries in the service industry. 
  Secondly, in order to be a world-class competitor, a manufacturer needs to build the 
capacity to offer products and services around the globe.  This means that globalized 
production is a prerequisite to worldwide competition.  Being hampered by size constraints, 
and its lack of managerial resources to run truly global operations, Taiwanese firms have 
only a limited capacity for internationalization. They have, however, sought to enhance 
their capabilities in other areas, notably in R&D, to offset their weaknesses in terms of 
internationalization.  The competition between Taiwan’s ODM producers and other 
contract manufacturers will intensify in the future as the market for manufacturing services 
becomes increasingly concentrated, where only the largest will survive.  It is envisaged that 
Taiwan’s ODM producers will remain highly specialized in product lines, but that their 
knowledge base will have to be elevated.  Their ability to process and combine knowledge 
from various origins also needs to be strengthened. 
  Thirdly, Taiwan’s industry has been particularly good at knowledge application, but 
not at knowledge creation.  Until now, Taiwan has depended on a social network between 
its specialists and those within the innovation centers to fetch and diffuse the technology.  It 
will become increasingly difficult for such a mechanism to function because knowledge 
will be guarded more and more intensely in the future.  As knowledge becomes more 
dispersed and more disintegrated, it is important for firms to own some knowledge of their 
own in order to trade or share it with others.  Knowledge creation is an important leverage 
for acquiring knowledge.   Taiwan currently spends only around 1.8% of its GDP on R&D, 
much lower than the expenditure of the advanced countries.  Worse still, the major source 
  23of R&D is contributed by the public sector, rather than the private sector.  Clearly, more 
R&D is called for from the private sector if Taiwan is to remain competitive in the new 
knowledge-based economy. 
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